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This paper identifies a class of symmetric coordination games in which the presence of
envious people helps players to coordinate on a particular strict Nash equilibrium. In these
games, the selected equilibrium is always risk−dominant. We also find that envious
preferences are evolutionary stable when they lead to Pareto−efficiency.
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Coordination games are representative of many interesting economic situations,
including for instance macroeconomic coordination failure, cooperation in teams and
arms races.1 However, due to the presence of strategic uncertainty, these games
exhibit multiple (strict) Nash equilibria which leaves economic analysis without sharp
predictions.
This equilibrium selection problem has been addressed in several and various
ways, using the risk-dominance criterion (Harsanyi and Selten (1988)), global games
(Carlsson and van Damme (1993)) and evolutionary processes.2 Nevertheless,
game theorists have still not reached a consensus regarding the predicted issue. In
particular, in coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria Harsanyi and
Seltenconsiderrisk-dominancetobeirrelevanttoequilibriumselection, partlybecause
Pareto-optimality and risk dominance may diverge and partly because the authors
argue that payoff dominance is a crucial aspect of their intuition. On the other hand,
stochastic evolutionary models favor either risk or Pareto dominance depending on the
adaptive rule (imitation or best-reply) as well as the number of rounds of matching per
period.3
The present paper considers another approach to investigating equilibrium selec-
tion problem in symmetric coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. In
acommonknowledgeframework, itisassumedthatplayersmayexperienceenvy. This
negative emotion is incorporated into the framework by constructing a psychological
game in the sense of Geanakoplos et al. (1989). In such a game utility is a function of a
player’s own payoff and his relative payoff. An envious player suffers if his opponent
earns a higher payoff and has some pleasure in the opposite situation. Thus, players
care about their relative position in a given outcome. Motivations for studying envy
in coordination games rely on several empirical and theoretical studies which have
emphasized the importance of envy and spitefulness as a motive for Pareto-efﬁciency
rejection.4
We identify a class of symmetric coordination games for which the presence of
envious people generates coordination on a particular strict Nash equilibrium. This
happens when the magnitude of asymmetry in payoff in out-of-coordination outcomes
is sufﬁciently large. We also establish a link with risk dominance, showing that the
equilibrium selected by envious players is always risk-dominant, but may be either
Pareto-efﬁcient or not.
The model predicts Pareto-gains rejection in some classes of symmetric coordi-
nation games. In these games, the psychological gain of deviation from the Pareto-
inferior equilibrium overcomes its cost. This is because the deviating player obtains a
higher status (relative to his opponent) in the out-of-coordination outcome than in the
Pareto-inferior equilibrium. Moreover, and perhaps surprisingly, the reverse also holds
in some other classes of coordination games, meaning that Pareto-optimality may be
1For more details see Milgrom and Roberts (1990) as well as Cooper and John (1988).
2See Kim (1996) for a survey.
3Wei-Torng (2002) provides an interesting comparison of the Kandori et al. (1993) and Robson and
Vega-Redondo (1996) models.
4see Beckman et al. (2002), Cason and Muy (2002) and Mui (1995).
1sustained by envious players. We then investigate the evolutionary stability of envi-
ous preferences in coordination games, and ﬁnd that they are evolutionary stable when
they favor Pareto-efﬁciency.
The next section provides the general analysis. Evolutionary stability of envious
preferences is examined in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Symmetric coordination games with envious agents
Consider two players, i = 1;2, who interact in the 2£2 symmetric game G described
in the table below. Let si 2 fA;Bg, pi and ui respectively denote player i’s strategy,




Assuming that a > c and d > b, G represents a coordination game with two strict
Nash equilibria (A;A) and (B;B). In strict Nash equilibria, players have no alternative
best reply so that they are particularly robust (for instance, they are subgame-perfect).
Coordination games describe perfectly contexts in which game theory is confronted
with an equilibrium selection problem.5 For our purpose, we consider situations in
which Nash-equilibria are Pareto-ranked. This is obtained by letting a > d, so that
(A;A) Pareto dominates (B;B).
Beside Pareto-dominance, risk-dominance is another solution concept proposed to
resolve the multiplicity problem of Nash equilibria.6 Equilibrium (A;A) is said risk
dominant if (a¡c)2 > (d ¡b)2. Similarly, (B;B) risk dominates (A;A) if the reverse
inequality holds.
Incorporating envy into the analysis amounts to constructing a psychological game
as deﬁned in Geanakoplos et al. (1989). In this game, ui is not only governed by
material payoff pi but also integrates opponent’s payoff pj. Concerning envy, such
subjective preferences may be simply deﬁned as follows.7
ui = pi+ai(pi¡pj): (1)
It is assumed that 0 · ai < 1 meaning that players are not too envious, in particular
none has a higher regard for his opponents than for himself. For ai = 0, players have
selﬁsh preferences and only maximize their material payoffs. The (psychological)
Nash equilibrium of G, denoted by (s¤
1;s¤










in which each player seeks to maximize his subjective preferences, taking the strategy
of the other as given.
5See Section 1.
6See Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
7See Bolle (2000), or Kirchsteiger (1994) or Bethwaite and Tompkinson (1996).
2The main objective here is to show that, in presence of envy, i.e., for 0 < ai < 1,
one may restrict the set of Nash equilibria in some classes of coordination games. This
is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Consider any symmetric 2£2 coordination games with Pareto-ranked
Nash equilibria. If there is some b > c so that (d ¡b)=(b¡c) < ai, then (A;A) is
the unique (psychological) Nash equilibrium of the game. On the other hand, (B;B)
constitutes the unique Nash outcome if there is some b<c so that (a¡c)=(c¡b)<ai.
Proof. Let b > c and consider ui(A;B) > ui(B;B). This inequality holds for





In that case, player i chooses A when player j’s strategy is B, for all i 6= j. On the other
hand, b > c does not prevent player i from playing strategy A when his opponent plays
A (as ui(B;A) < ui(A;A)). Thus, 8aj and j 6= i, player j’s best reply is A. As a result,
(A;A) is the only Nash equilibrium of the game.
Consider now b<c. In that case, player i=1;2 has no (psychological) incentive to
play A against B, but may experience sufﬁcient envy to play B against A. This happens





At the same time, b < c does not involve ui(A;B) > ui(B;B) and thus (B;B) is here the
only Nash equilibrium of the game.
Finally, in games with b = c, envious preferences are equivalent to selﬁsh ones (as
payoffs of both players are equal in all possible outcomes), so that coordination games
remain with two strict Nash equilibria. ¤
Theorem 1 identiﬁes a class of coordination games in which the presence of
envious agents generates coordination.8 This depends on payoffs players can earn
in out-of-coordination outcomes. In particular, these outcomes have to present some
sufﬁcient asymmetries in payoffs (b < c or b > c) to generate coordination. Notice
that this process does not necessary induce efﬁciency, as envy may lead to the Pareto-
dominated Nash equilibrium.
Conditions in Theorem 1 inform us that coordination happens when the psycho-
logical gain of deviation, from a particular Nash equilibrium, overcomes the cost of
this deviation. This does not mean that the material gain from deviation has to be
higher and, in fact, it turns out to be lower in coordination games (by assumption).
Thus, an envious player is willing to incur a cost provided that his strategy sufﬁciently
degrades the payoff of his opponent. For instance, coordination on Pareto-efﬁciency
requires that the gain of deviation from (B;B), ai(b¡c) > 0, is higher than its cost
d ¡b. The psychological gain comes from the fact that the player who deviates may
8Notice that it is sufﬁcient that one player fulﬁlls conditions in Theorem 1 to ensure this result,
meaning that only one envious player is sufﬁcient.
3reach a higher status, relativeto his opponent in outcome(A;B), even if he incurs a cost
in term of material payoff. In that case A becomes a dominant strategy (under envious
preferences), and thus (A;A) constitutes the only issue of the game. This mechanism
is also at work when (B;B) represents the unique issue of the coordination game.
Notice that coordination through envy favors outcomes equalizing payoffs, which
in some cases may reveal to be fairer9 than coordination failures (A;B) or (B;A)
(whose occurrence has a positive probability under selﬁsh preferences). This is clearly
true for (A;A) but may also hold when envy selects the Pareto-dominated equilibrium
(B;B). This happens when c < d since here both players earn a higher payoff in (B;B)
than in (A;B) or (B;A).
Finally one can establish a connexion between theorem 1 and the risk-dominance
criterion. This is stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 In symmetric 2 £ 2 coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash
equilibria, if a (psychological) Nash equilibrium constitutes the unique outcome of
the game, then it is also risk-dominant.
Proof. Assume that (A;A) is the unique psychological Nash equilibrium and (B;B)
risk-dominates (A;A). From theorem 1, we know that b > c so that (d¡b)=(b¡c) <
ai. By deﬁnition of risk-dominance, we also have a¡c < d ¡b which contradicts
(d¡b) < ai(b¡c) as a > b (recall that a > d but d > b). The same reasoning applies
when (B;B) is the unique psychological Nash equilibrium and (A;A) risk-dominates
(B;B), which completes the proof. ¤
The intuition behind Corollary 1 is as follows. The occurrence of an unique
equilibrium requires (as a necessary condition) some asymmetries in payoffs, b < c
or b > c (Theorem 1). These asymmetries have to be sufﬁciently high to reduce the
cost of deviation from the discarded Nash equilibrium, which amounts to say that it is
less risky to deviate from this equilibrium. As a result, the selected Nash equilibrium
has to be risk-dominant (under restrictions deﬁned in Theorem 1).
3 The evolution of envious preferences
In the previous section, we have investigated when envious preferences could favor
coordination assuming envy as given. To complete the analysis, one may ask what
sustains the presence of such preferences in coordination games. In particular, the
question is whether envy can prevail and dominate in a (polymorphic) population
composed of both selﬁsh and envious preferences.
One way for analyzing the latter question is to resort to the indirect evolutionary
approach.10 Here, selﬁsh and envious preferences compete and evolve through an
evolutionary process selecting in the long-run preferences giving higher expected
success. In this framework, the common knowledge assumption is maintained
and evolutionary stability applies to preferences not to strategies, as deﬁned in the
traditional evolutionary game theory.
9In the egalitarian sense.
10See for instance Bester and Güth (1998).
4Let R(a;b) represent a player’s success when he has the envious parameter a and
his opponent has the parameter b. A preference parameter a¤ 2 [0;1] is said to be
evolutionary stable if it satisﬁes
(1) R(a¤;a¤) ¸ R(a;a¤) 8a,
(2) if R(a¤;a¤) = R(a;a¤) for a 6= a¤, then R(a¤;a) > R(a;a).
Letk=(d¡b)=(b¡c)andconsidertwotypesofpreferences, 0·a<k andk<a<1.
Call these types respectively the non-envious and the envious types. We can then state
the following result.
Theorem 2 In coordination games where (A;A) is the unique psychological Nash
equilibrium, a is the unique evolutionary stable type of preferences.
Proof. Let (A;A) be the unique psychological Nash equilibrium. By Theorem 1, b > c
so that (d ¡b)=(b¡c) < 1 which implies that R(a;a) = a. However, we also have
R(a;a) = a since common knowledge ensures that a non-envious player (a) perfectly
knows that his opponent (who is of the envious-type a) always play A.
ItremainstoshowthatR(a;a)>R(a;a). Duetouncertaintyconcerningtheoppo-
nent’s strategy when both players are of type a, coordination failure occurs with a non
negative probability. Then, R(a;a) has to be lower than R(a;a), that is R(a;a) < a,
because
(1) a > b;c;d and,
(2) R(a;a) represents the expected payoff of a a-type when confronted to a large pop-
ulation of a-players, and then coordination failure will occur with a non-zero proba-
bility. ¤
This result indicates that the envious-type may prevail in the long-run in a
population playing a coordination game in which Pareto-efﬁciency is the unique
psychological Nash equilibrium. The reason why is the uncertainty non-envious types
generate on coordination which, in turn, gives a positive probability to the occurrence
of coordination failure and then limit success of these preferences. A similar result
cannot be establish in coordination games where (B;B) is the unique psychological
Nash equilibrium. To see why, observe that although R(a;a) = R(a;a) = d, one
may have R(a;a) ¸ d as a > d. As a result, a population of envious-players may be
invaded by non-envious agents. Obviously, one could ﬁnd a subclass of coordination
games selecting (B;B) in which envy can survive. However, this would correspond to
a very restricted subclass of games.
4 Conclusion
This paper has shown that incorporating envy into the analysis allows to solve the
problem of multiple Nash equilibria in some classes of coordination games. This
happens in games where the magnitude of asymmetry in payoff in out-of-coordination
outcomes is sufﬁciently important to ensure that psychological gains from deviation
overcomes its cost. One interesting result here is that the selected Nash equilibria is
also risk-dominant.
5For convenience we have restricted our attention to 2£2 symmetric coordination
games. It would be interesting to extend the analysis to n-person generalized
coordination games. One of the main difﬁculties in carrying such an extension resides
in the choice of the reference payoff to be used in the formalization of envious
preferences: do agents compare themselves with all others or only with the average
payoff of the group? One way to solve this selection problem would be to use the
indirect evolutionary approach to evaluate the survival of envious preferences when
both types of reference payoff are present in the population.
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